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INTRODUCTION 
 In a democratic society, the people are both the authors and subjects of the law, but what 
that means varies from democratic theory to democratic theory. For deliberative democrats, or 
proponents of deliberative democracy, the authority to give law and the reason to accept the law 
as legitimate and binding is partially grounded in the deliberation of the people.1 Worded another 
way, if a democratic society is to have coercive authority over the people under its jurisdiction, 
then for the deliberative democrat that coercive power is constrained, or justified, by the 
deliberative activities of those same people.2 Different deliberative theorists vary in their 
understanding those deliberative activities.  This article does not seek to present or defend a 
particular deliberative theory; rather the approach is meta-theoretical: to identify some positive 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 
PRESS (2004), 3. (Explaining that deliberative democracy’s “most important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving 
requirement).  
2 See, for example, a number of papers in: James Bohman & William Rehg eds., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (The MIT Press 1997). 
 2 
features of deliberative democratic theories. The best way to identify these features is by 
analyzing the inadequacies of particular deliberative theories. 
To begin the discussion, John Rawls’ idea of public reason will be presented as a foil to 
contrast with Robert Talisse’s recent pragmatist inquiry approach to deliberative democracy.3   
Part I will present some important insights and some shortcomings of Rawls’ theory.4 Part II will 
then present Talisse’s inquiry account of deliberative democracy, focusing on how Talisse 
accommodates what is right about Rawls’ theory yet avoids some of weaknesses.5 Part III 
continues the ideas in Part II, but with a focus on the limitations of Talisse’s pragmatist inquiry. 
Finally, Part IV demonstrates what an adequate deliberative theory might look like while 
discovering how Rawls’ and Talisse’s theories seem inadequate.6 
 
I.  RAWLS AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON 
 Because of the abundance of literature concerning Rawl’s theory of public reason, this 
article focuses only on giving a rough sketch of some of its key features, showing some strengths 
and fundamental weaknesses of his theory. The discussion of Rawls is used here as a heuristic 
device both to highlight the strengths of Talisse’s account and to help discover some desirable 
features which a good deliberative theory should take seriously.  
 One of the most important aspects of Rawls’ theory is that he identifies the central 
problem for democracy.7 According to Rawls, a fundamental feature of modern democratic 
                                                 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 See infra Part II. While I take Talisse to be an improvement on Rawls, there are still some crucial problems that 
Talisse does not solve.   
6 Although suggesting an adequate deliberative theory is beyond the scope of this article, some important ways in 
which deliberative democratic theory might progress will be suggested. 
7 See generally John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). [Hereinafter 
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited]. 
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societies is the existence of pluralism.8 The idea is that, as a matter of fact, there will be “a 
plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical and moral, 
[which] is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.”9 Pluralism is not merely a 
historical accident. Pluralism arises as a natural result of the institutions of modern democratic 
societies and is therefore a permanent feature.10 
The existence of pluralism is especially problematic for deliberative democracy. If people 
in a democratic society are going to be vulnerable to the coercive power of the society, then they 
need to view the use of coercive power as legitimate in some sense. In republican terms, people 
in a democratic society need to see the use of coercive power as non-arbitrary interference with 
their lives.11 If people are to be subject to the coercive power of society, then they must have 
some reason to think that the coercive power is being used legitimately. Moreover, in a 
democracy, the people are the ones who authorize the use of coercive power, and in a 
deliberative democracy the deliberation of the people grounds the use of that coercive power, 
and justifies accepting the use of coercive power as legitimate.12  
If all that is true, then the problem presented to the deliberative democrat is that, in at 
least some cases, many people will have good reason not to accept—or no good reason to 
accept—society’s use of coercive power. If the justification for the legitimate use of coercive 
power requires members of the society to see the use of that power as reasonable, and since 
many members of the society will fundamentally disagree about what counts as a good reason 
then at least in some, and perhaps many, cases the use of coercive power will not be seen as 
                                                 
8 Id. at 765. 
9 Id. at 766.  
10 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987). [Hereinafter 
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus]. 
11 See, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (Oxford University Press 
1997). 
12 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
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legitimate. After all, pluralism is permanent and implies that at least some comprehensive 
doctrines will be mutually exclusive. The implication is that if a society is deemed illegitimate by 
some of its members, then, at best, the society would be unstable, and at worst, unjust.  
Rawls attempts to solve this problem with the idea of public reason.13 For Rawls, there 
may be widespread disagreement at the level of comprehensive doctrines—i.e., broadly shared 
worldviews that include beliefs and values regarding morality, politics, religion as well as 
personal and political beliefs about how a society ought to operate.14 This is because of the 
existence of pluralism, which allows for “overlapping consensus”15 of reasons among all 
reasonable doctrines which can be used to justify the society’s use of coercive power. Rawls 
defines this overlapping consensus as public reason.  
This article discusses two problematic features of Rawls’ understanding of public reason: 
1) public reason is too restrictive both in what is deliberated about, and in what reasons can be 
used in deliberation, and 2) the reason for accepting the constraints of public reason is too 
contingent, lacking the normative weight to properly motivate citizens to accept those 
constraints. Whether Rawls has adequate responses to address these concerns or whether they are 
ultimately problematic extends beyond the scope of this article. However, if another deliberative 
theory does not face these problems, then that theory would be preferable to Rawls’.  
 As to the first issue that the idea of public reason is too restrictive, Rawls explicitly states 
that the content of public reason—i.e.,  the issues about which citizens deliberate—is limited to 
discussions of constitutional essentials and the basic structure of society.16 Further, deliberating 
                                                 
13 See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7.   
14 See, Paul Voice, Comprehensive Doctrine, in THE CAMBRIDGE RAWLS LEXICON 126, (Jon Mandle & David A. 
Reidy eds., Cambridge University Press 2014).  
15 See, e.g. Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10. 
16 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7 
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citizens are supposed to limit themselves to only offering reasons that they “reasonably think that 
other citizens might also reasonably accept.”17 
 Restricting public deliberation to constitutional essentials and questions about the basic 
structure of society is problematic because much of society’s coercive power involves political 
actions and policies that do not relate directly to the basic structure or constitutional essentials. 
Importantly, “principles covering social and economic inequalities” seem to fall outside the 
constitutional essentials and basic structure.18 Now, one might say that these issues would be 
resolved by a well-structured constitution and society. Even so, public deliberation should occur 
at some point down-stream from how the constitution is set up if the political actions of society 
are to be seen as legitimate or justified.  
 Perhaps one of Rawls’ motivations for limiting public reason to the basic structure and 
constitutional essentials is that the reasons which can be offered in public deliberation do not 
seem to deal with more substantive issues. When discussing constitutional essentials, regardless 
of any particular individual’s comprehensive doctrine, it seems that appealing to ideas such as 
“fair and equal treatment under the law” or “liberty of conscience”19 would provide reasons that 
all, or most, citizens could reasonably accept. However, when discussing who can and cannot get 
married, for example, appealing to biblical authority is only a reason for those who hold that the 
bible is authoritative, and thus is a reason that is reasonably rejected. Certainly, one could not 
offer biblical authority as a reason to justify some aspect of the basic structure of society and 
could offer “fair and equal treatment” as a reason to justify the society’s recognition of non-
                                                 
17 See id. at 771. 
18 JAMES BOHMAN & WILLIAM REHG, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS, The MIT 
Press (1997), 107.  
19 See Nicholas G. Karambelas, Where the First Amendment Comes from, 50 Md. B.J. 4, 10 (July/August 2017) 
(defining liberty of conscience as “the freedom to follow one’s religious or ethical beliefs”).  
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traditional marriages. However, it appears that Rawls seems to think that there will be more 
consensus regarding constitutional essentials.20 For the religious and non-religious alike, “fair 
and equal treatment” and similar types of reasons could be seen as sufficient for justifying 
universal suffrage, However, for many religious people “fair and equal treatment” would not be 
sufficient to justify recognizing non-traditional marriage, and any reasons that might be 
sufficient for deciding the case either way would be reasonably rejectable by other citizens. 
Thus, the restrictions public reason places on public discourse are problematic.  
Rawls might be right, but if another theory could allow for deliberation to occur over a 
greater range of topics, and not lead to countervailing problems, it would certainly be a good 
thing. If the deliberation of citizens were active at multiple levels of societal policy-making, and 
if citizens were allowed to offer reasons precluded by Rawl’s public reason theory, it seems 
likely that those same citizens would feel that society’s actions were justified. More importantly, 
if society took at least some of the “reasonably rejectable” reasons of citizens seriously it is 
likely that citizens would be more invested in society, which in turn would lead to a more stable 
society. On Rawls’ account, either one offers and accepts the limited use of reasons, or one is 
completely ignored, creating tension and animosity.21 
 Disallowing certain reasons and restricting deliberation has a tendency to create tension 
and animosity in society. Thus, from a Rawlsian perspective there needs to be explanation as to 
why citizens within a polity would even agree to have deliberation restricted in precisely the way 
Rawls suggests.22 There are two reasons Rawls offers that would provide citizens reason to 
adhere to public reason: the idea of overlapping consensus, and a duty of civility,23 each of which 
                                                 
20 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7. 
21 See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7. 
22 Id. at 766.  
23 See id.; see also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10. 
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will be discussed in turn. The problem, however, is that neither of these reasons has the 
normative weight to sufficiently motivate people to be bound by public reason.    
 Even though there is a plurality of comprehensive doctrines which citizens can, and do, 
hold within a free democratic society, Rawls is only concerned with reasonable ones.24 The 
reasonable doctrines of citizens will, generally, converge on a political conception of justice that 
will motivate them to follow public reason. There are at least two problems with the overlapping 
consensus that call into question whether it is sufficiently normative to be motivational. First, 
whether comprehensive doctrines overlap in the way necessary for public reason to occur is a 
purely contingent matter, and therefore lacks the modal strength to be normatively motivational. 
Second, what counts as a “reasonable doctrine” is either question-begging or does not dissolve 
the tension that could arise within a pluralistic society where the voices of certain citizens are 
necessarily excluded.  
 Regarding the former issue, public reason is supposed to mediate between doctrines that 
seem to mutually exclude each other’s conceptions of the good, the right, and the true.25  
However, if there is such a plurality of doctrines it is at least possible that the doctrines would 
not be able to converge on a similar enough conception of justice to encourage the citizens to 
hold to the strictures of public reason. It might be true that in the actual world there is such an 
overlapping consensus, but there is nothing that would guarantee that there would be a 
consensus, or that if there were such a consensus that it would remain. Further, to suggest that 
there are certain facts about human nature or psychology that leads one to expect that there will 
                                                 
24 See generally Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7; see generally Rawls, The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10.   
25 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7. 
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be such a consensus is not a move readily available to Rawls or the Rawlsian.26 To do so would 
be to introduce a reasonably rejectable understanding of human nature at a meta-level, to ground 
the fact that one is not allowed to introduce reasonably rejectable conceptions at the political 
level. The upshot, however, is that since an overlapping consensus is so contingent and fragile, it 
does not seem that it could justify the use of public reason in the way Rawls theory needs.  
One move available to Rawls, and in fact the one he makes, is that the overlapping 
consensus need only be among the reasonable doctrines.27 Thus, the problematic is dissolved 
precisely because it is reasonable to think that there might be some overlap and convergence 
among reasonable doctrines.28 However, appealing to the reasonableness of doctrines has 
problems of its own. If it is a fairly broad notion of what counts as reasonable, then the possible 
doctrines may not sufficiently overlap, or if they do, there is no guarantee that the consensus will 
be stable. Yet, if it is a fairly restricted notion of what counts as reasonable, perhaps guaranteeing 
the overlapping consensus, then there is the potential for alienating a significant enough number 
of citizens. This would result in a destabilizing effect on society, which would cause Rawls to 
beg the question in his defense of a liberal polity.29  
Rawls seems to take the latter alternative. Rawls’ overall project is to defend a liberal 
polity, going so far as to claim that he “believe[s] that in fact any workable conception of justice 
for a democratic regime must indeed be in an appropriate sense liberal.”30 Yet it seems 
inappropriate for Rawls to have grounded a liberal political conception of justice on the fact that 
reasonable doctrines will converge on such a conception. As a reasonable doctrine is one that has 
                                                 
26 Rawls actually does make such an appeal to human psychology. See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus, supra note 10 at 22. 
27 See Infra Part __ for what Rawls means by reasonable doctrine. 
28 See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10 
29 Cf. Matteo Bonnati, Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason, 14 EUROPEAN J. POLITICAL THEORY 
180 (2006) 
30 See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10 at 5. 
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a political conception of justice which is broadly liberal.   Rawls explains what a reasonable 
doctrine is: 
When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines, it means that all of these doctrines, both religious and 
nonreligious, support a political conception of justice underwriting a 
constitutional democratic society whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy 
the criterion of reciprocity.   Thus, all reasonable doctrines affirm such a society 
with its corresponding political institutions: equal basic rights and liberties for all 
citizens, including liberty of conscience and the freedom of religion.   On the 
other hand, comprehensive doctrines that cannot support such a democratic 
society are not reasonable. 31 
 
Thus, Rawls has not justified a liberal polity, he has stipulated it.  
 Even if one were to follow Rawls this far, he has not really solved the problem of 
pluralism. Pluralism arises not as an aberration but when a democratic free society is functioning 
as it is supposed to.32 It is thus possible that many citizens will come to hold non-liberal, and thus 
unreasonable, comprehensive doctrines, raising the specter of the contingency, tension, and 
animosity. The only apparent solution would be a modus vivendi33 compromise—something 
Rawls is at pains to avoid.34 
 Assume that Rawls is right about reasonableness and that there will be a convergence on 
a political conception of justice that is not problematically contingent or exclusionary. Any 
reasonable political conception of justice, according to Rawls, satisfies “the criterion of 
reciprocity,” which is understood as a duty of civility.35 It is this duty which provides the real 
normative force for citizens to limit their deliberation to the constraints of public reason.36 
                                                 
31 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7 at 801. Emphasis added. 
32 See Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10.  
33 Latin for “mode of life”.  Here it means a situation where parties agree to live together peaceably without coming 
to any particular fixed agreement. 
34 See id. at 1 
35 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Columbia University Press (1993). 
36 Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7 at 803. 
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 The duty of civility manifests as a willingness to respect other citizens’ autonomy and 
liberty since “we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may 
reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions.”37 In other words, the 
duty of civility requires citizens to respect each other as reasonable and rational. When justifying 
any political action one attempts to persuade on the basis of mutually agreeable, or reasonable, 
terms which others could reasonably accept “as free and equal, and not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position”38 
 Two problems arise for the duty of civility because “[t]his duty, like other political rights 
and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty.”39  First, it appears that the duty is symmetrical. The 
limit on the duty of civility is the fact that one should stick to the constraints of public reason 
“provided that other citizens also accept those terms.”40 Thus, citizens who do not respect the 
duty of civility are not owed the duty either, and can, therefore, be manipulated, dominated or 
ignored, leading, once again to the destabilizing effect of tension and animosity among the 
citizenry.   
 The second problem is that since the duty of civility is simply one moral duty among 
many, when the duty of civility conflicts with more important duties, one need not be bound to 
the constraints of public reason.41 Even assuming that citizens generally accept the duty of 
civility and value public reason, in very many cases, especially the hard ones, it is not 
implausible to think that other duties would override the duty of civility,42 leading to a 
                                                 
37 Bohman & Rehg, supra note 5 at 134. 
38 Id. at 132. 
39 Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7 at 769. 
40 Id. at 770. 
41 See, e.g., Eric Brown, Rawls and the Duty of Civility, IWM JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWS CONFERENCES (2003), 
https://www.iwm.at/wp-content/uploads/jc-15-01.pdf. 
42 Consider a parallel case where one is not bound by a promise when a more important duty—e.g. saving 
someone’s life—interferes. 
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breakdown of public reason. Even if these conflicts were few and far between, the fact that 
public reason might not be maintained when dealing with the most important and difficult issues 
is gravely problematic since it is the really difficult and important issues where public reason 
was supposed to help.43 
 Three lessons can be learned from the discussion so far. First, any adequate deliberative 
democratic theory must acknowledge the existence of pluralism and be able to deal with the 
problems that occur because of it, namely the destabilizing influence that arises from the conflict 
and tension inherent when a citizenry holds a diversity of potentially mutually exclusive values. 
Second, if a political society has coercive power, then in a democratic society the use of that 
power should, at least, be constrained by the people. Therefore, all else held equal, in a 
deliberative democracy the broader the scope of what can be deliberated about the better. Finally, 
if citizens are to deliberate there must be some normative reason that would compel citizens to 
deliberate, in general, and to deliberate in the ways required by a particular deliberative theory.  
 
II. TALISSE AND PRAGMATIST INQUIRY 
 Turning, then, to Robert Talisse’s inquiry account of deliberative democracy to see how 
he deals with the three features of an ideal deliberative democratic theory identified in the 
previous section. Talisse suggests that based on epistemic norms which all reasonable persons 
hold, we are already committed to a particular form of inquiry.44  Further, he claims that those 
same epistemic norms commit us to a deliberative democratic politics.45 Although Talisse has 
                                                 
43 Micah Lott makes this point forcefully. See Micah Lott, Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint: A 
Problem for Rawls’ Ideal of Public Reason, 87 PAC. PHIL. Q. 75 (2006). 
44 See, e.g., Robert Talisse, Towards a Peircean Politics of Inquiry, 40 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE 
SOC’Y 21 (2004) 
45 Id.  
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argued for this position in many places,46 the focus of this note will be on how he has articulated 
it in his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.47 Importantly, Talisse maintains that his 
pragmatist defense of democracy can adequately deal with the existence of reasonable 
pluralism—and is the only one that can.  
 Talisse’s argument is based on his understanding of C. S. Peirce’s epistemology.48 Before 
getting into his justification of deliberative democracy, it is important to understand Peirce and 
how Talisse interprets him. Talisse begins by considering Peirce’s essay, The Fixation of Belief.   
In Fixation, Peirce “catalogue[s] four distinct ways in which we may attempt to assuage doubt 
and settle belief; [e]ach of these ways is, on Peirce’s view, a method of inquiry.”49 The four 
modes of inquiry are: the method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a priori method, and 
the method of science.50 According to Peirce, only the method of science can actually assuage 
doubt and settle belief, because only the method of science is a method of belief refinement while 
the other forms of inquiry are aimed at belief preservation. The tenacious believer dogmatically 
clings to his or her beliefs, ignoring all counter evidence, the authoritarian believer defers all 
judgment to a supposed authority, and the a priori believer settles belief through agreement with 
social convention.51  
 Contrary to many commentators on Peirce, Talisse believes that Peirce is not putting 
forward the method of science as the correct form of inquiry and then evaluating the other forms 
                                                 
46 Id.; Robert Talisse, Deliberative Democracy Defended: A Response to Posner’s Political Realism, 11 RES 
PUBLICA 185 (2005); Robert Talisse, Liberalism, Pluralism and Political Justification, 13 THE HARVARD REV. OF 
PHIL. 57 (2005).  In Deliberative Democracy Defended: A Response to Posner’s Political Realism, he refers to his 
position as Deweyan Democracy which seems ironic since Talisse has famously been quite critical of Deweyans. 
47 ROBERT TALISSE, A PRAGMATIST PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY (Routledge 2007). [Hereinafter TALISSE, A 
PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY]. 
48 See Michael Bacon, The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy, 36 PHILOSOPHY AND 
SOCIAL CRITICISM 2 (2010).  
49 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 56. 
50 See C. S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 1 (1877). 
51 Peirce supra note 50 
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of inquiry against it. Rather, Peirce is providing an immanent critique of our epistemic practices 
and showing that only the method of science satisfies the epistemic norms we already hold. 
According to Talisse: 
Peirce’s argument is that the non-scientific methods fail to satisfy some condition 
that is internal to inquiry, and therefore we cannot self-consciously adopt them.  
… Put in another way, Peirce’s argument is not so much recommending to us the 
scientific method as he is showing us that—given what we already take inquiry to 
be, and given what we already understand the point of inquiry to be—we have no 
choice but to reject all but the scientific method.52 
 
Peirce, according to Talisse, begins from the assumption that “we are reasoning creatures... [w]e 
engage instinctively in acts of inferring, deducing, guessing, hypothesizing, and experimenting 
with a view towards predicting and preparing ourselves for future happenings.”53  In essence, we 
are naturally inquirers. Peirce’s self-understood explicit aim in Fixation is to understand the 
various ways individuals inquire. The various methods of inquiry are not merely “algorithm[s] 
that an inquirer enacts when confronted with doubt; a method of inquiry entails a wide range of 
habits and commitments that run beyond the particular beliefs it produces.”54 In fact, the four 
modes of inquiry should be understood as “epistemic character-types” or “four kinds of 
believer.”55 
 Therefore, according to Peirce, the tenacious believer’s epistemic character is 
fundamentally dogmatic while the authoritarian and a priori believers are deferential. Most 
importantly these believers’ are not responsive to reasons. “The scientific believer, by contrast, 
attempts not to preserve existing beliefs, but to discover beliefs that will not occasion doubt. To 
accomplish this, the scientific believer seeks beliefs that are responsive to reasons, evidence, and 
                                                 
52 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 59. 
53 Id. at 60. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 61. 
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argument.”56 In this way, the scientific believer aims at having, in some sense, true beliefs, or 
beliefs that are truth-apt, and the scientific believer’s character is epistemically responsible.  
Not only are the non-scientific methods of inquiry flawed, but the corresponding 
character traits are self-undermining. “A belief, in order to be a belief, is such that it is 
responsive to reasons and evidence. That is a very part of what it is to have a belief—a 
constitutive norm of belief is that a belief is something that one holds for reasons.”57 Talisse 
suggests that Peirce’s purpose in Fixation is to point out, on the one hand, that the non-scientific 
methods violate this constitutive norm, and on the other hand, that no non-scientific believer can 
self-consciously adopt a non-scientific method.58 He believes this for two reasons. First, the non-
scientific believer, in order to preserve his or her belief, must aim to have true beliefs—i.e., 
reason-responsive beliefs—about his or her dogmatic and deferential practices. Second, Peirce 
realized that one seldom, if ever, maintains a belief when one recognizes that “it was produced 
by means of a method that has no truth-tracking or reason-responsive propensities. [In other 
words,] non-scientific believers take themselves to be scientific inquirers.”59 Thus, non-scientific 
modes of inquiry entail an epistemic character that is self-deluded. There are certain 
requirements for being an epistemically responsible agent, which, according to Talisse and 
Peirce, is what we all take ourselves to be.60 Only scientific inquirers are self-controlled and self-
aware in the way necessary to be epistemically responsible. Therefore, we are already committed 
to scientific inquiry, and the character traits that are entailed by it.   
                                                 
56 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 61. 
57 Cheryl Misak, Making Disagreement Matter: Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy, 18 J. OF SPECULATIVE 
PHIL. 9, 12 (2004). 
58 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at __.  
59 Id. at. 62. 
60 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 and Peirce supra note 50. 
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 There is an important upshot of Peirce’s epistemology: a political one.61  Talisse argues 
that the same norms which govern inquiry, and the same character traits that make an individual 
an epistemically responsible agent, entail a commitment to deliberative democracy.62   There is 
the obvious fact that individuals do not exist in isolation and that beliefs are influenced by social 
relations. Thus, “[a]ny method of inquiry which does not aim to settle belief in the community 
cannot successfully avoid doubt,”— precisely the point of inquiry.63 
 A distinguishing characteristic of the method of science is that it alone “recognizes that 
the truth is ‘public’ and available to all who inquire properly.”64 The non-scientific methods, by 
contrast, hold that truth—if it exists—is in some way dependent on “something human and 
private.”65 The tenacious inquirer holds that truth is dependent on him or herself, and actually 
seeks to avoid the beliefs of others in fear that they might unseat his or her beliefs.66 The 
authoritarian inquirer holds that truth is dependent on a single authority, and the a priori inquirer 
holds that truth is dependent on some group’s “feelings and purposes.”67 
Talisse maintains that each form of inquiry aligns with a certain form of political order 
and social organization, which should be readily apparent from the epistemic characteristics of 
that form of inquiry and the view of truth that it holds.68 This method of tenacity is radically 
anarchic: the individual is the sole locus of concern and the beliefs of each are completely 
independent. The method of authority commits one to an extreme form of Orwellian 
                                                 
61 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 62. To be clear, Talisse is putting forward a political view 
that is Peircean, and not that of Peirce.   
62 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47. 
63 Id. at 63. 
64 Id.  
65 Id,  
66 See Yael Levin Hungerford, Charles Pierce’s Conservative Progressivism, Boston College, Morrissey College of 
Arts and Science, 68 (2016), https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir%3A107167/datastream/PDF/view. 
(Hungerford provides a detailed analysis on Pierce’s idea of truth).   
67 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 63.  
68 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 54. 
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authoritarianism. The a priori method commits one to a version of epistemic aristocracy and thus 
to aristocratic rule.69 Importantly, each of these forms of political organization is self-defeating, 
or unstable, in the same way that the corresponding method of inquiry is: at some point the 
method breaks down and doubt arises. There is no perfect way for one to avoid all interaction 
with others and realizing that others hold different views occasions doubt. Thus, anarchy cannot 
be maintained. No matter how powerful the authoritarian dictator he or she cannot prevent his or 
her subjects from being exposed to doubt-inducing reasons. Further, the authoritarian dictator is 
implicitly committed to Pierce’s scientific method to be able to successfully maintain his or her 
rule. Finally, the same holds true, mutatis mutandis,70 for aristocracy and the a priori method.  
According to Talisse, these forms of political organization are all incompatible with self-
controlled and properly conducted inquiry.71 Therefore, one cannot be an epistemically 
responsible agent under these types of political conditions.  Further, as Talisse and Pierce have 
argued scientific inquiry is the only form of inquiry, which is epistemically responsible.72 Thus, 
by that very fact, one is committed to the idea that truth is public. Moreover, scientific inquiry is 
also committed to the idea that “the method of inquiry must, at least potentially, involve the 
participation of the entire community.”73 Indeed, scientific inquiry commits one to belonging to a 
community of inquirers, since it is only in community that one’s beliefs can be tested and 
corrected. As Talisse suggests, “[t]he Peircean image of a community of inquiry is inherently 
democratic.”74 
                                                 
69 Imagine a political system similar to the one found in George Orwell’s dystopian novel. See GEORGE ORWELL, 
1984 (Signet Classics 1950).  
70 Latin: “changing what needs to be changed”; the idea is that a similar argument can be made by making the 
appropriate alterations for the other cases but it does not change the underlying point. 
71 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47. 
72 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 54 and Peirce supra note 50. 
73 Id. at 65. 
74 Id. at 66. 
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The idea is that the scientific method requires epistemic agents to be open to correction, 
constantly willing to revise his or her beliefs in light of new arguments and evidence. This, in 
turn, requires responsible believers to engage in reason-exchange and openness to disagreement 
and opposing views. The lesson which Talisse, therefore draws is that: 
there are social and political requirements for proper inquiry: Inquirers need 
access to forums in which inquiry can be engaged; they need to be able to appeal 
to reliable sources of information and news; they need access to processes by 
which they can hold their representatives, and their government more generally, 
accountable; they need the freedom to engage controversial ideas and to speak, 
write and express themselves freely. In short, proper inquiry can be practiced only 
within a democratic political order.75 
 
 In essence, then, the Peircean justification of democracy runs along the same lines as the 
Peircean justification of the scientific method. Therefore, the Peircean justification of democracy 
proceeds as an immanent critique of the alternative theories. “The claim is that, just as we are all 
at least implicitly scientific inquirers, we are all at least implicitly democrats simply by virtue of 
the epistemic commitments that follow from the very phenomenon of belief.”76  Of course, that 
is not to say that people do not practice non-scientific forms of inquiry, or that people are not 
anti-democratic. Talisse, and by extension Peirce, are only claiming that we are all implicitly 
committed to scientific inquiry and democracy whether we realize it or not.77  
 Not only do the norms implicit in our epistemic practices commit to democracy all 
epistemic agents, who at least take themselves to be responsible, but it commits them to a 
particular type of democracy, namely a deliberative one.  Further: 
[t]he responsible epistemic agent … is committed to a view of citizenship 
according to which those who simply assert their raw preferences in political 
debate and in decision contexts are failing at democratic citizenship in the same 
way the tenacious believer is failing at inquiry. Just as inquirers must attend to 
reasons, argument, and evidence in forming their beliefs, democratic citizens must 
                                                 
75 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 66. 
76 Id. at 67. 
77 See TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 54 and Peirce supra note 50. 
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engage each other’s reasons.   In this way, the Peircean view is an epistemic view 
of democracy … [which] entails a political commitment on the part of individuals 
to a state that promotes proper citizenship.  … [S]ince proper belief requires 
reason exchanging, one cannot be a responsible epistemic agent in isolation … 
Hence a responsible epistemic community is necessary for there to be individuals 
who are responsible epistemic agents.  Moreover … the community of proper 
inquiry must be cultivated and maintained by social institutions that encourage 
the exercise of proper epistemic agency.78 
 
 Pluralism should be addressed before returning to some of the concerns that arise from 
the form of democracy that Talisse’s view entails. According to Talisse, his view is fully 
consistent with the fact of pluralism.79 Because being an epistemically responsible agent requires 
not only engaging others’ reasons but actively seeking out and engaging dissenting views, 
Talisse maintains that pluralism enhances his conception of democracy.80 In fact, one norm 
which Talisse believes is implicit in the scientific method is something he calls “epistemic 
agonism, a norm of ongoing engagement with those with whom one disagrees.”81  Further, 
because the same norms that govern proper inquiry also commend a particular political 
arraignment, the existence of pluralism requires agonistic politics. “Such a politics differs from 
many forms of deliberative democracy in that it is not immediately aimed at agreement or 
consensus. Rather, the Peircean conception of democracy envisions an ongoing agonism between 
competing reasonable claims, a perpetual argument within democracy about democracy itself.”82  
In this way, not only is the Peircean conception of democracy consistent with pluralism, but, as 
Talisse suggests, it is actually improved by it.83  
                                                 
78 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 70-71. 
79 Id. at 76. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 90. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
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 The strengths of Talisse’s account should be readily apparent, but so are some of its 
weaknesses. In some ways, it is precisely the strengths that are its weaknesses. However, and 
more importantly, the larger issue is that the entailments which Talisse draws from the norms 
which govern proper inquiry do not seem to necessarily follow. Thus, this article will 
acknowledge both the strengths and weaknesses of Talisse’s Peircean conception of democracy.  
 The Peircean conception of democracy, articulated by Talisse, is a substantive 
conception. It is inherently normative and aims to cultivate particular character traits among its 
citizens, in part, by having institutions that promote and enhance proper epistemic practices.84 
Thus, “the Peircean view might be thought of as an epistemic perfectionist conception of 
democracy, since its substance—and, correspondingly, its view of the formative role of 
democratic politics—derives exclusively from our epistemic commitments.”85 
 Generally, it has been argued that substantive conceptions of democracy are inconsistent 
with the existence of pluralism.86 Any substantive conception of democracy entails certain 
commitments that are reasonably rejectable by epistemically responsible agents. However, 
Talisse maintains that such criticisms do not apply to all substantive conceptions of democracy.87   
In particular, the epistemic norms that govern epistemic perfectionism are not reasonably 
rejectable in the way moral norms or metaphysical understandings of the good can be reasonably 
rejected. In order to reasonably reject something, one must reject it for reasons, argue against, or 
offer evidence. Yet, these things are all precisely the norms that are part of epistemic 
                                                 
84 Id. at 54. 
85 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 72. 
86 Talisse himself has argued precisely this, particularly with regard to the Deweyan account of democracy.  See, 
e.g., Robert Talisse, Can Democracy Be a Way of Life? Deweyan Democracy and the Problem of Pluralism, 39 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 1 (2003); Robert Talisse & Scott Aikin, Still Searching for a 
Pragmatist Pluralism, 41 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 145 (2005); Robert Talisse & Scott 
Aikin, Why Pragmatists Cannot Be Pluralists, 41 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 101 (2005).  
87 Talisse & Aitkin supra note 72.  
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perfectionism. Therefore, epistemic perfectionism as a substantive account of democracy cannot 
be reasonably rejected.  
 
III. PROBLEMS FOR PRAGMATIST INQUIRY 
 In some ways, Talisse has a view similar to Rawls’ regarding how to deal with the 
existence of pluralism. Rawls claimed that there would be an overlapping consensus regarding a 
political conception of justice, for any reasonable doctrine, and it is based on that overlapping 
consensus that deliberation could begin.88 What Talisse offers is a more theoretical 
understanding of overlapping consensus and what counts as a “reasonable doctrine.”  If Talisse is 
right and the norms articulated by epistemic perfectionism are intrinsic to, and constitutive of, 
what it means to be a believer, then regardless of whatever position one holds regarding justice, 
or the moral good, one cannot reasonably reject the epistemic norms of proper inquiry.89 Thus, 
unlike Rawls, one need not hope that there will be an overlapping consensus, since what it means 
to be an epistemic agent is precisely the norms that govern democracy and deliberation.  
 Further, one need not offer reasons that one “reasonably think[s] that other citizens might 
also reasonably accept.”90 It is merely the willingness to offer reasons and engage in argument—
precisely because epistemic perfectionism does not aim at consensus or agreement. The only way 
a view could not be considered is if the view is committed to epistemic irresponsibility.  Yet, if 
Talisse is right, no view takes itself to be epistemically irresponsible. 91 Therefore, Talisse 
                                                 
88 See discussion supra Part I 
89 See discussion supra Part I 
90 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 7 at 771. 
91 That is not to say that a view might fail to be epistemically responsible and offer bad reasons, or no reasons at all, 
but to even criticize alternative views one is already engaged in scientific inquiry, and by that very fact is committed 
to deliberative democracy. 
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appears not to be subject to the contingency and potential alienation of citizens that seemed to be 
problematic for Rawlsian public reason.  
Notice also that epistemic perfectionism seems to solve some of the other issues that arise 
for Rawls. Public reason and overlapping consensus seemed to lack the normative weight to 
encourage and guarantee deliberation. By appealing to the epistemic norms that govern proper 
inquiry epistemic perfectionism entails at least a prima facie obligation to deliberate. Part of 
what is required to be an epistemically responsible believer is to engage in argument and reason 
exchange; thus, again if Talisse is right, deliberation is normatively required. Certainly, some 
citizens within a polity may refuse to deliberate, but that is a practical issue. The normative force 
behind deliberation is still there.  
Finally, public reason limits deliberation to just constitutional essentials and the basic 
structure of society.92 Epistemic perfectionism requires that deliberation should be about any 
judgment, value, position, or policy.93 In order to be an epistemically responsible agent one is 
committed to ongoing deliberation about anything truth-apt or reason responsive. Hence, the 
same will hold for any political judgment or policy.  There is no limit on what can or should be 
deliberated about.  
 Overall, it seems that Talisse’s Peircean conception of democracy fairs better than 
Rawlsian public reason as an account of deliberative democracy. However, there are some 
concerns that arise about whether it is actually an adequate account of a deliberative democratic 
politics. Three main worries will be considered here regarding epistemic perfectionist 
deliberative democracy. First, it is unclear whether the epistemic norms function the way that 
                                                 
92 See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reasons Revisited, supra note 7 at 775.  
93 See J. Caleb Clanton & Andrew T. Forcehimes, Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan 
Democracy?, 6 CONTEMPORARY PRAGMATISM 2 (Dec. 2009). 
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Talisse thinks they do, and whether they are in fact the norms that necessarily govern proper 
inquiry and epistemic responsibility. Second, it is not clear that, even granting Talisse his 
epistemic norms, democracy is entailed in the way that he thinks it is. Finally, even if Talisse is 
right about the epistemic norms that govern proper inquiry, and that those norms entail a 
deliberative democracy, Talisse’s account does not really solve the issue that arises for 
democracy in light of pluralism. The problem that democracy must address is a question of the 
legitimate use of the society’s coercive power. The existence of pluralism raises the question of 
whether citizens can accept it as legitimate.   
 Regarding the first issue of whether the norms he articulates do, in fact, govern epistemic 
responsibility, Talisse states that “[t]he epistemic commitments that lie at the core of Peircean 
democracy … state a set of principles that are consistent with any well-developed epistemology 
… internalists, externalists, foundationalists, coherentists, and so on.”94 The problem, however, 
is that this does not seem to be the case. One can imagine a strong externalist epistemological 
theory, such as reliabilism, that would not endorse the Peircean view.   Reliabilism claims that 
one knows or believes that p, or was produced by a process that reliably produces true beliefs.95 
A reliable process does not need to be reason-responsive; it merely needs to be reliable at 
producing true beliefs, regardless of whether the agent knows that the process is reliable. The 
crux of Peircean inquiry is reason-responsiveness, and therefore there is a sense in which it can 
reasonably be rejected because there are ways of knowing that are truth-apt but not reason-
responsive. Similarly, some virtue epistemologists hold that tenacity and deference to authority 
                                                 
94 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 96. 
95 Alvin Goldman, Reliablism, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/reliabilism/v-1 (last viewed Jan. 12, 2020).  
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can be epistemic virtues.96  Since, by definition, such “epistemic virtues” are inferior forms of 
inquiry, the Peircean cannot countenance them. The point is that there are ways of knowing that 
seem epistemically responsible—or at least not irresponsible—that are anti-Peircean.   Thus, 
Talisse cannot claim that Peircean epistemic perfectionism “identifies and draws upon only those 
epistemic norms that are already implicit within the epistemic practice of all believers.”97 
 Ultimately, the problem is that, though Talisse denies it, Peircean epistemic perfectionism 
is tied to certain philosophical commitments that can be rejected by epistemically responsible 
agents. For Talisse and Peirce to say that a belief is true is to claim that it is indubitable, or that it 
would forever withstand further objections. However, there is no reason to think that to claim 
that something is true is to claim that it is indubitable. On a correspondence theory of truth, a 
belief is true when it stands in a particular relation to some mind independent “object”.98 On a 
disquotationalist theory of truth “X” is true, just in case, X.99 Both of these theories of truth do 
not require that beliefs be indubitable for them to be true. As another example, some 
philosophers hold that chicken-sexers100 know the sex of baby chicks, but at the same time their 
beliefs about the sex of chicks are dubitable, if not dubious.101 In all these cases, one need not 
necessarily engage in further Peircean inquiry, or withhold belief, simply because the belief does 
                                                 
96 See, for example, LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, VIRTUES OF THE MIND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF VIRTUE AND THE 
ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). 
97 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 87. 
98 See Edward Zalta, ed., STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2016/entries/truth-correspondence/ 
99 See Edward Zalta, ed., STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Philosophy (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2014/entries/truth-deflationary/. “Just in case” is technical jargon identifying necessary and sufficient conditions 
similar to the phrase “if, and only if”; in more formal logical notation this would be indicated by a double-arrow 
biconditional. 
100 These are people whose job it is to identify the sex of baby chicks, and they seem to know the sex of chickens but 
do not have reasons, or at least good reasons, for holding the beliefs they do about the sex of the chicks.  Discussed 
at length in ROBERT BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM, Harvard Univ. 
Press (2000). 
101 See BRANDOM supra note 82. 
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not satisfy the Peircean requirement that true beliefs “would forever withstand the scrutiny of 
inquiry.”102 
  Although there is some intuitive force behind the Peircean account which Talisse offers, 
and it certainly is an epistemically respectable view in its own right, there are alternative 
epistemologies that are just as respectable that are, at least partially, inconsistent with Peircean 
inquiry. Thus, there can be epistemically responsible agents that could reject the Peircean view; 
therefore Talisse cannot claim that “everyone” is committed to Peircean inquiry and deliberative 
democracy.  
 Certainly, Talisse could claim that while all that has been suggested is correct, it does not 
follow that Peircean epistemic perfectionism can be “reasonably” rejected, and there is an 
obvious way that this is true. Notice, however, the claim is not that it could be “reasonably” 
rejected, per se, but that it could be rejected by “epistemically responsible agents” or “in some 
sense reasonably rejected.” The wording here is important.   However, it seems that one could 
claim that one can “reasonably” reject Peircean inquiry in precisely the way that Talisse thinks 
that one cannot. Talisse’s claim was that in order to reasonably reject Peircean inquiry, one is 
already committed to the epistemic norms it proscribes, such as offering reasons and evidence.103 
The problem is that a successful argument would require the definition of “reasonableness” or 
what counts as “reasons” to become so vague and broad that it is trivial. Thus, the virtue 
epistemologist, the reliabilist, and the correspondence-truth theorist have reasons for rejecting 
Peircean inquiry, namely that it is false. Therefore, it seems odd to say that offering such a 
reason is consistent with Peircean inquiry.  
                                                 
102 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 97. 
103 Id. at 76. 
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 The second concern with Talisse’s view is that even if Talisse is right about the implicit 
acceptance of Peircean inquiry, it does not seem that the democratic political organization he 
envisions is entailed by it. Talisse believes that Peircean inquiry entails a deliberative democracy 
that not only has the more standard: 
democratic norms and institutions … [such as] norms of equality, free speech, 
freedom of information, open debate, protected dissent, access to decision-making 
institutions, access to public education, and so on … there must be norms in place 
of the sort often associated with radical democratic views, such as norms and 
institutions that promote participation, inclusion, and recognition. Further, there 
must be institutions of distributive justice to eliminate as far as justice allows the 
material obstructions to democratic citizenship. 104  
 
The problem is that there are other forms of political organization that could allow for epistemic 
perfectionism that are not only not democratic in the way Talisse describes but may not be 
democratic at all.  
 The purpose of Peircean inquiry is to arrive at true beliefs about a wide variety of 
topics.105   Further, on the Peircean view one can only arrive at true beliefs if one inquires with 
others in a community and engages views that are different or contrary to one’s own. Thus, all 
that is required for inquiry to succeed is a vibrant public sphere where such discussions can 
occur. Hence, the only political arrangement that is necessary for inquiry to be successful is one 
that allows for just this type of public discussion, and it need not be democratic. Consider the 
Prussia of Fredrick the Great, as viewed by Kant: “Argue as much as you like and about 
whatever you like, but obey!”106 Such a circumstance is fully consistent with epistemic 
perfectionism107. After all the community of inquiry is able to aim at true beliefs and be 
                                                 
104 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 72. 
105 See Edward Zalta, ed., STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
sum2019/entries/truth-pragmatic/ 
106 Immanuel Kant, An answer to the question: ‘What is Enlightenment?” in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 54, 59 (H. 
S. Reiss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press (2009). 
107 See Clanton & Forcehimes, supra note 77.  
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epistemically responsible believers, but they need not have any political power at all—
democratic or otherwise. Now certainly, such a society might be unstable, and the vibrant public 
sphere of inquiry might actually have an influence on political decisions and be broadly 
democratic in that sense. However, the point remains that one can be an epistemic perfectionist 
of the kind that Talisse and Peirce think we all are, and still not be committed to a democratic 
political organization in the way that Talisse thinks we are. In other words, the immanent critique 
of our epistemic beliefs does not carry across to an immanent critique of our politics.  
 The final issue that arises with Talisse’s Peircean account is that even if one grants that 
Talisse can answer the other worries, he has not solved the problem that pluralism causes for 
deliberative democracy. The problem of pluralism is a moral problem, not an epistemic one.   
The question is not whether one should accept democratic politics because only within a 
democracy can one be epistemically responsible, but whether the coercive use of power which 
the polity wields is seen as legitimate by its citizens. So, even if citizens can deliberate about 
what policies should be instituted, and deliberate about them within a community of scientific 
inquirers, there is no reason to think that a policy that is instituted will be acceptable to all the 
citizens. In fact, if pluralism is true, there is reason to think that it will not be acceptable to all 
citizens, precisely because the Peircean conception of democracy “is not immediately aimed at 
agreement or consensus” but instead it “envisions an ongoing agonism between competing 
reasonable claims.”108 Importantly, what is missing is a decision procedure; a way to close 
debate is not possible within the Peircean conception of democracy. Thus, Talisse is forced into a 
dilemma: on one hand, if a democratic polity has a decision procedure and a way to close debate, 
even if only for the time being, then it is inconsistent with the ongoing agonism that Talisse 
                                                 
108  TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 90. 
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envisions. The decision that is reached might be reasonably rejectable by some of its citizens—
precisely because there is a plurality of reasonable moral, political and metaphysical positions a 
citizen can hold, even if all citizens hold the same epistemic views. On the other hand, if a 
democratic polity continues in its ongoing agonism of competing claims, then the polity will be 
functionally worthless since no policy, or very few, will ever be instituted. Either way, the polity 
will be illegitimate: partially illegitimate in the former case, since not all citizens will see the 
decisions made and instituted as legitimate uses of coercion, and fully illegitimate in the latter 
case, since it is doubtful that any citizen would find such a polity acceptable.  
 In essence, Talisse has not addressed pluralism, but side stepped it.109 Talisse fails to 
appreciate the full force of pluralism in another way as well. As articulated by Rawls, the 
existence of pluralism is a permanent feature of free societies.110 In order to avoid making 
inquiry futile, Talisse has to deny that pluralism is a permanent feature. Epistemic perfectionism 
aims at beliefs which are true, in the sense of being indubitable.111 The existence of a plurality of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines gives one a reason to think that there is a reason to doubt all, 
or any, of them. If this were permanently the case, then at least in many circumstances there 
would be little point in engaging in inquiry since there could be no rational resolution to such a 
situation. It is only if a rational resolution is at least, in principle, possible that inquiry could, or 
should occur. Thus, Talisse is actually denying pluralism, reasonable or otherwise. Indeed, he 
only accepts that people do hold a variety of beliefs and doctrines, and there is an epistemic 
benefit to this, namely that it encourages inquiry.112 Talisse is correct to claim that it might be an 
open question whether a strong and permanent version of pluralism is in fact obtainable, but in 
                                                 
109 See generally TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47. 
110 Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, supra note 10 at 4. 
111 See generally Clanton & Forcehimes, supra note 77 
112 TALISSE, A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 at 72. 
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order for one to accept the Peircean account Talisse puts forward, one must assume that it does 
not.  
 
IV. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 Thus far, the discussion has focused on the expository or critical. However, this focus 
was in service of a larger goal. By looking at the two forms of deliberative democracy discussed 
here, and highlighting some of their strengths and weaknesses, it is possible to identify some 
criteria—or at least some good-making features—for an adequate deliberative democratic theory. 
In this section of the article, some of these possible features will be discussed. To be clear, this 
note will not put forward an alternative deliberative democratic account. Rather, it will suggest 
ways that one can evaluate any deliberative democratic theory. It might turn out that no 
deliberative democratic theory can satisfy all the suggestions that will be made, but any theory 
which can satisfy more, would appear to be ceteris paribus a better theory.  
 Again, one of the most important things a deliberative democratic theory must be able to 
do is be able to cope with the existence of pluralism. Further, whether or not pluralism is a 
permanent feature of a free society, an adequate theory must be able to both provide normative 
reasons for citizens to deliberate and be able to justify any policies the polity makes to all its 
citizens, on the assumption that pluralism is a permanent feature. As discussed, Rawls fails on 
both counts, and Talisse seems to do somewhat better, but ultimately fails as well.  
 Related to the fact of pluralism is the issue of what is to be done about persistent 
disagreement. In a free society of whatever size where there are a plurality of doctrines, values 
and perspectives, the possibility of consensus and agreement is virtually nil. Therefore, in a 
democratic society there must be appropriate mechanisms in place to come to decisions but that 
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at the same time leaves the ability to constantly and consistently reevaluate and reconsider any 
decisions.113 Otherwise, the society would be completely unacceptable. This will serve two 
purposes. First, it will allow for the epistemic benefits which Talisse identified by engaging 
alternative views to reach better decisions. Second, this will make decisions more acceptable to 
those who disagree with them, since if they realize that they can continue to argue against a 
decision, and have the possibility of affecting further decisions, then it does not seem that the 
decision would be illegitimate in the same way that more permanent decisions might be.  
  Talisse is right about his ongoing agonism but failed to have the mechanisms in place for 
coming to a decision. Relatedly, Rawls sought to avoid modus vivendi situations.114 An adequate 
deliberative theory should not necessarily reject such compromises; in fact, if consensus is 
unlikely at times negotiation and compromise might be the best option available. However, 
certain norms need to be accepted by all citizens for agonism to be fruitful. In particular:  
impetus needs to be given toward the liberalizing of democracy’s tradition of 
tolerance to more effective protection and integration of minority and non-
conformist groups, for the protection of the majority itself against illiberalism, 
bigotry and cultural conceit, and toward the tempering of the quality of patriotism 
and sub-group loyalties. 115 
 
In other words, the main virtue of a democratic citizen is not reciprocity, or civility, but 
tolerance. Tolerance is a weaker norm and thus more likely to be acceptable. Further, even if 
Talisse is not entirely correct about the relationship between epistemic perfectionism and 
epistemic responsibility,116 he does not seem to be entirely wrong either. Tolerance is what is 
                                                 
113 Perhaps not unlike some of the things Gutmann and Thompson describe.  See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
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actually required to get his agonism off the ground and seems to be necessary if alternative views 
will even be considered.  
 Tolerance, unlike some of the epistemic norms Talisse considers, is also a moral norm 
and is thus a better response to pluralism, even if epistemic norms might provide a way for 
motivating why citizens should deliberate at all.117 Further, if Talisse is right, it is the epistemic 
norms of responsible believing that entail tolerance, even if they do not entail democracy. This 
brings up the next feature of a deliberative democratic theory. Deliberative democrats ought to 
avoid trying to justify democracy as such; instead, democracy should be assumed on grounds of 
justice. Any political arraignment that does not allow citizens the ability to affect the decisions 
that affect their lives is prima facie unjust.  Only democracy allows all citizens this ability; 
therefore, only democracies are prima facie just. In other words, a deliberative democratic theory 
should justify itself as a superior democratic theory—democracy itself should be taken for 
granted. In this way, the deliberative democratic is not fighting on two fronts; defending both 
democracy, in general, and deliberative democracy. 
 An implication here, then, is that integral to democracy and justice is something like an 
“all affected principle.”118 Anyone affected by a decision or policy should have some say in that 
decision or policy. Worded differently, there should be some way to shape those decisions and 
policies that affect one’s life. Notice, also, that if the “all affected principle” holds, then in a 
deliberative democracy there must be multiple fora where debate can occur, and these fora will 
be at various levels of political influence—national, sub-national, and transnational. Therefore, 
an adequate deliberative democratic theory must allow for deliberation about a wide range of 
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118 See Sofia Nasstrom, The Challenge of the All-Affected People Principle, 59 POLITICAL STUDIES (2011). 
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issues and cannot be bound to deliberation only within certain pre-determined boundaries—both 
actual and metaphorical.  
 One final idea that can be gleaned from Talisse is that the epistemic norms he discusses, 
and epistemic considerations generally,119 might provide good reasons for citizens to deliberate, 
despite the fact that those same norms do not necessarily entail democracy. Thus, by putting 
democracy and justice first, the deliberative democrat can then argue for the superiority of a 
deliberative theory over other democratic theories based on epistemic norms and benefits. In this 
way, the ideal deliberative democratic theory can include both primarily moral norms such as 
justice and toleration, and more pervasive epistemic norms as justifications for its overall 
account. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This article has been an investigation of deliberative democratic theory. By carefully 
considering two particular accounts, namely Rawls’ and Talisse’s, important insights regarding 
some good-making features of any adequate deliberative theory were made.   By highlighting the 
inadequacies of Rawls’ and Talisse’s theories one can come to understand what the broad 
outlines of a deliberative democratic theory should be. In particular, any adequate deliberative 
democratic theory must account for at least three things. First, it should be able to address the 
problem of pluralism, and the response to pluralism must be both moral and epistemic. Second, 
while being cognizant of the epistemic benefits of deliberation, moral norms need to play an 
important role, in particular questions of justice. Third, it must be able to motivate deliberation 
and account for the legitimacy of decisions across a wide range of issues, sites, and scales of 
                                                 
119 See, e.g., Estlund’s epistemic account of deliberative democracy. David Estlund, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK Princeton Univ. Press (2008). 
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deliberation—which entails on the one hand the acceptability of compromise and negotiation, 
and on the other the creation of institutions on the sub-national, national, and transnational scale.  
 Although Talisse’s justification for a deliberative democracy was not completely 
successful, there is something to his strategy that other deliberative democrats should take 
seriously. The use of an immanent critique of our democratic commitments will prove the best 
way of defending and motivating a deliberative democratic theory. This follows from the 
suggestion, made above, that in one’s theorizing one should take a “democracy first” attitude. 
Then, by investigating what we take democracy to be, deliberation, discussion, toleration, an “all 
affected principle” and so forth should naturally follow merely from the idea of democracy itself. 
If Talisse proved nothing else it was that justifying democracy, as such, will always run into 
problems. Interestingly, putting democracy first may solve additional problems, or at least 
suggest solutions. For example, what counts as reasonable, acceptable or legitimate will be 
explained in reference to what we understand a democracy should be.  
 Again, the intention is not to defend a particular deliberative theory, rather, to suggest a 
way forward for deliberative democracy and to offer some criteria by which particular versions 
of deliberative democracy may be evaluated. Importantly, these criteria were identified through 
evaluating other theories, and in that way the criteria are not arbitrary. The features put forth are 
by no means exhaustive, and it may turn out that no deliberative theory will be able to 
satisfactorily address them all. To the degree that a theory can, it will suggest the superiority of 
that theory in relation to others. 
